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Abstract The contemporary psychoanalytically inflected vocabulary of relational ethics 
centres on acknowledgement, witnessing and responsibility. It has become an important code for 
efforts to connect with otherness across fractures of hurt, oppression and suffering. One can see 
the deployment of this vocabulary to challenge patterns of exclusion and dehumanisation in 10 
zones of intense political conflict in many situations in which destructive hatred reigns. This 
paper traces some of the use of and disputes over this ‘acknowledgement-based’ relational ethics 
in the recent work of Jessica Benjamin and Judith Butler. The field of application is their 
response to Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, given their position as Jews.  The challenge of 
the acknowledgement agenda leads back to an issue of general concern – the degree to which 15 
relational ethics can prise open apparently closed and defensive psychosocial identities. 
Keywords: relational ethics; recognition; acknowledgement; conflict; Jewish identity; Israel-
Palestine 
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The relational ethics of conflict and identity 
 Context 
The contemporary psychoanalytically-inflected vocabulary of relational ethics, which is 
concerned with the quality of the connections that people (‘human subjects’, as they seem to be 5 
known) form with one another, centres on acknowledgement, witnessing and responsibility. This 
vocabulary draws on some philosophical luminaries, notably Martin Buber and Emmanuel 
Levinas, as representatives of a tradition of thought that focuses on the project of living an 
ethical life. Relational ethics is consequently a term used to describe this project. It has become 
an important way of thinking about and promoting efforts to link with otherness across fractures 10 
of hurt, oppression and suffering. One can see the deployment of this vocabulary to challenge 
patterns of exclusion and dehumanisation in zones of intense political conflict in many situations 
in which destructive hatred reigns, including several where there have been post-conflict ‘truth 
and reconciliation commissions’ (eg, Potter, 2006). It is also used in some situations in which 
conflict continues, especially where there is a history of oppression and injury looming 15 
menacingly over the present. 
Perhaps because it is one of the most intractable of these situations, the theory and 
practice of recognition and acknowledgement is particularly visible in relation to the Israel-
Palestine conflict. The orientation of this work, articulated especially by Jewish critics of Israel, 
is towards advocacy of Jewish ‘responsibility’ for conflict and suffering there. This intervention 20 
is not just theoretical, though theory is important both for its rhetorical force in sending messages 
through the Jewish, Israeli and Palestinian communities and also because of the concepts it offers 
that can be worked with in a practical way. Such practice includes political engagement, group 
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meetings among Israelis, Palestinians and ‘internationals’, and psychotherapeutic work by 
activist groups in Israel-Palestine (eg, BISR, 2009).  
This paper traces some of the use of and disputes over this ‘acknowledgement-based’ 
relational ethics in the recent work of two highly significant Jewish writers, Jessica Benjamin 
and Judith Butler. The field of application is their response to Israel’s treatment of the 5 
Palestinians given their position as Jews. In this instance, the complex layering of such responses 
has provoked a kind of crisis for many Jews influenced by, and feeding back into, their notions 
of Jewish ethics, culture and historical legacy, as well as their attachment to and identification 
with Israel. The challenge of the acknowledgement agenda leads back to an issue of general 
concern – the degree to which relational ethics can prise open apparently closed and defensive 10 
psychosocial identities. But it also raises a number of reflexive problems, in particular around 
accusations of a kind of reverse Jewish exceptionalism that makes Jews more responsible than 
others for suffering and a related set of questions concerning what it is that each of us is 
responsible for and what might be the role of therapeutic relational practices in advancing this 
responsibility in situations of conflict. The recognition paradigm is a powerful one, but it has its 15 
limits, to which I will return in this paper. 
 The Vocabulary of Relational Ethics 
The vocabulary of relational ethics leans heavily on articulations of brokenness. Hurt and 
abasement figure prominently in this vocabulary; as do, in more hopeful moments, reconciliation 
and reparation. Presumably this is because relationships are so obviously central to human 20 
subjects, even constitutive of them; yet they are also so difficult to manage, so frequently 
damaged and damaging, so forlorn. They fail, as psychoanalysts have always known: 
dependency, from earliest infancy onwards, signals vulnerability and the prospect of intentional 
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or unintentional betrayal. The ethical relationship is one that responds to this necessary difficulty 
, trying to find a way around it, trying to find a way (as Marshall Berman, 1982, so poignantly 
wrote) to ‘keep on keeping on’, without sacrificing the subject or the other, but also without 
losing the impulse towards connectedness. The ethical relationship is built on the capacity to 
recognize the other as a subject; but what is meant by this ‘recognition’ is not always clear. The 5 
ethical relationship does not deny that hurt occurs and acknowledges this when it happens; but it 
also sees that full acknowledgement is impossible, because it too is embroiled in the dynamics of 
hurt. 
The vocabulary of relational ethics draws on the terms that swirl around in the thinking of 
contemporary philosophers and philosophically oriented psychoanalysts.  ‘Recognition’, for 10 
example, is drawn from Hegel and is the topic of intense debate amongst social theorists who 
wish for equality and benevolence to operate between social subjects. An exemplary sociological 
figure here is Axel Honneth (1996), for whom ‘affective recognition’ grounded in childhood 
experiences in the family is the source of the kind of emotional stability and security of selfhood 
that is necessary for social life. It is also a term employed by psychoanalytic theorists who wish 15 
for equality and benevolence to operate between analysts and patients. Much of what is 
discussed under this heading concerns the questions of what constitutes recognition and whether 
it can ever be enough to sustain an ethical relationship. In social theory, recognition is one focus 
of a debate about equality that addresses identity politics: without recognition, identity cannot be 
manifested in an emancipatory way; groups are disowned, sidelined, stigmatised. Recognition 20 
politics demands that a space is made for these stigmatised groups; that they are acknowledged 
as a site of existence, of actuality and value. Nancy Fraser (2000) comments,  
5 
 
[T]he politics of recognition aims to repair internal self-dislocation by 
contesting the dominant culture’s demeaning picture of the group. It 
proposes that members of misrecognized groups reject such images in 
favour of new self-representations of their own making, jettisoning 
internalized, negative identities and joining collectively to produce a self-5 
affirming culture of their own—which, publicly asserted, will gain the 
respect and esteem of society at large. The result, when successful, is 
'recognition': an undistorted relation to oneself. (pp. 109–110) 
Recognition therefore follows from the assertion of identity by stigmatised groups; it 
is a bootstrapping exercise in which subjects come together to say ‘I am’.   As Fraser 10 
points out, tactically this results in encouraging stigmatised groups to assert their 
identities; it makes identity politics the core of emancipatory practice. But this reading 
also underplays an important element of the recognition hypothesis, the idea that it is 
in being recognized by the other that existence comes into being. Fraser herself 
proposes a reworking of recognition theory based on ‘social status’, in which it is 15 
exclusion from social interaction that matters. That is, in her status model, 
‘misrecognition constitutes a form of institutionalized subordination’ related to 
injustice: in being misrecognized, people are denied their rights. But, she states, 
'[N]ote precisely what this means: aimed not at valorizing group identity but rather at 
overcoming subordination, in this approach claims for recognition seek to establish the 20 
subordinated party as a full partner in social life, able to interact with others as a peer' 
(p. 114). 
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The notion of justice will be returned to, ‘aimed not at valorizing group identity but rather 
at overcoming subordination.’ The idea of justice raises the issue of the insufficiency of 
recognition, how reliance on recognition threatens to obscure power differentials in a move that 
makes everyone equally responsible for ethical acts. Attending to justice has implications for the 
distribution of responsibility and of emancipation. It reminds us that some people are more 5 
dispossessed and victimized than others; so if the reparative urge implicit in recognition is to 
mean anything, it will have to mean restitution as well as reconciliation. But here it is sufficient 
to note that Fraser links the act of recognition with how one is treated by the other; and it is 
through that treatment that one adjusts how one relates to oneself. 
Despite significant differences in their tolerance of identity politics as a potentially 10 
emancipatory category, there are reverberations of the sociological position on recognition in 
much intersubjective psychoanalytic work. Fraser’s description of Hegel’s originary version 
might have come out of Jessica Benjamin’s psychoanalysis. Fraser (2000) writes:  
According to Hegel, recognition designates an ideal reciprocal relation 
between subjects, in which each sees the other both as its equal and also as 15 
separate from it. This relation is constitutive for subjectivity: one becomes 
an individual subject only by virtue of recognizing, and being recognized 
by, another subject. Recognition from others is thus essential to the 
development of a sense of self. To be denied recognition – or to be 
‘misrecognized’ – is to suffer both a distortion of one’s relation to one’s self 20 
and an injury to one’s identity. (p. 109) 
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Benjamin (2000) writes, 'The problem of whether or not we are able to recognize the other 
person as outside, not the sum of, our projections or the mere object of need and still feel 
recognized by her or him, is defining for intersubjectivity' (p. 294).  
What Benjamin calls a ‘subject-subject’ psychology grows out of recognition as the 
capacity to appreciate the other as a centre of consciousness, separate from the subject but also in 5 
relation to it. Recognition is defined in opposition to omnipotence, though perhaps it is better 
expressed as in opposition to what can be seen as a form of colonisation: we see the other and we 
see the limit of what we can see; we do not try to take it over or make it part of the self. It is in 
not invading the other that ethical relationality based on recognition adheres; as Judith Butler 
(2005) says, ‘If letting the other live is part of any ethical definition of recognition, then this 10 
version of recognition will be based less on knowledge than on an apprehension of epistemic 
limits’ (p. 42). We do not know the other; we know the other only as a subject we cannot fully 
know. In her account of what it might mean to give an account of oneself, Butler links this 
epistemic limit with opacity, with the awareness that each of us is opaque to ourself, hence we 
are in the same relationship to the other that we are in with ourselves when we face that dark 15 
hole of non-knowing that is, amongst other things. perhaps, the unconscious. Some time ago, 
Julia Kristeva (1988) commented that the existence of an unconscious ‘inside’ each of us means 
the haunting of the individual human subject by something else, strange, foreign, and real: the 
‘uncanny, foreignness is within us: we are our own foreigners, we are divided’ (p. 181). Butler 
(2005) translates  a similar idea into the language of sight and blindness and hence of visual 20 
perception: ‘[W]e might consider a certain post-Hegelian reading of the scene of recognition in 
which precisely my own opacity to myself occasions my capacity to confer a certain kind of 
recognition on others. It would be, perhaps, an ethics based on our shared, invariable, and partial 
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blindness about ourselves’ (p. 41). Seeing the other is based on an appreciation that we cannot 
see the essential part of them, the part that passes between us, ‘enigmatically’ in the vocabulary 
employed by Laplanche (1999), who is Butler’s psychoanalytic source. It is a message that 
reaches us but cannot be read, a text in an uninterpretable foreign language. Recognizing this, we 
must try not to spoil the other by making it something else than what it is. 5 
Recognition staves off damage by holding back. This does not mean that the other is left 
untouched. In line with the general orientation of psychoanalysis, Benjamin (1998) offers a 
developmental account of the intersections between subjects involved. She adopts Winnicott’s 
(1969) idea that an object becomes ‘useful’ if it can survive the subject’s destructive attacks, 
demonstrating that it is resilient and has a real existence outside the subject’s fantasy. Benjamin 10 
makes this capacity to test and be tested by the other part of the central dynamic of 
intersubjectivity and hence of recognition. We hurt the other and yet the other stays alive; this 
dynamic makes mutual recognition possible, creating the Hegelian and intersubjective subject. 
The resilience of the other in the face of our attacks on it, and its continuing willingness to 
recognize us as subjects, is what constitutes us as real and as available for a relationship. 15 
Relational ethics is founded on the capacity to test and respect the other, to find the limits of 
destructiveness through which the other’s autonomy can be established and pleasure in its 
separate being can be enjoyed. In ‘the intersubjective conception of recognition,’ writes 
Benjamin (1998), ‘two active subjects may exchange, may alternate in expressing and receiving, 
cocreating a mutuality that allows for and presumes separateness’ (p. 29).  20 
The cycle here is the classical one of negation and survival, of a destructiveness that does 
not ultimately destroy, so that the subject can know the limits of its own being. The subject may 
feel that it has destroyed the other; but, if the other survives and remains non-retaliatory in its 
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attitude, then the subject experiences the difference between its fantasy of destructive 
omnipotence and the reality of a world full of separate subjects. As Winnicott (1969) put it, the 
other then becomes of use. But perhaps this is too ameliorative, too neglectful of the actual 
damage that destructiveness can cause. Butler (2000), perhaps taking the Winnicottian dimension 
of destruction in fantasy too literally, writes, ‘[I]f negation is destruction that is survived, of what 5 
does survival consist? Certainly, the formulation implies that destruction is somehow overcome, 
even overcome once and for all. But is this ever really possible – for humans, that is? And would 
we trust those who claim to have overcome destructiveness for the harmonious dyad once and 
for all? I, for one, would be wary’ (p. 285). That is to say, how real is destruction if it never 
destroys? What, exactly, is being recognized here? 10 
 The Economy of Injury and the Acknowledgement Agenda 
We are talking here not solely of how to recognize others, but of harm done and how to undo it.  
This is where the language of acknowledgement starts to displace that of recognition. For Butler 
(2004), there is a Levinasian element at play in which appreciation of the precariousness of the 
other is central to ethical subjectivity. Levinas demands a response to the Face that is founded 15 
not in some abstract privileging of the other, but, rather, in awareness that we might be tempted 
to murder the other and must fight that temptation in ourselves. The struggle is ‘within’ the 
subject; if it were not so, then there would be no ethics at stake – all would be smooth and easy; 
there would be no temptation that one needs to resist. It is like the old religious issue of freedom 
of choice and evil: what is the virtue of virtue if one cannot choose to do wrong? Butler writes, 20 
‘If the Other, the Other’s face, which after all carries the meaning of this precariousness, at once 
tempts me with murder and prohibits me from acting upon it, then the face operates to produce a 
struggle for me, and establishes this struggle at the heart of ethics’ (p. 135). Ethics has a struggle 
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at its heart, the heart that reflects a face that could be the stimulus to murder. ‘If the first impulse 
towards the other’s vulnerability is the desire to kill, the ethical injunction is precisely to militate 
against that first impulse’ (p. 137). Psychoanalytically speaking, as Butler (2009a) points out in 
her more recent work, it is Klein rather than Winnicott who comes into the frame here. The 
subject is formed through an act of violence that nevertheless leaves the subject needing to find 5 
ways to contest or renounce violence in order to preserve itself as a subject. This follows directly 
from Butler’s reading of Levinas’s temptation to murder: violence exists; it is not ameliorated 
into an aggression that simply tests the reality of the other through its moments of survival; it can 
really kill. Violence is itself a force; the subject is ‘mired’ in it.  
Yet all this does not mean that the response to the constitution of the subject in violence 10 
must itself be a violent response; rather, it shows how the struggle with and against violence is 
intrinsic to elemental human subjectivity. Non-violence as an ethical possibility arises from the 
struggle against the violence that is constitutive of the human subject. Ethical violence means 
that the subject is made through the enforcement of regulatory categories on being; Butler 
(2009a) names ‘genders or social categories’ (p. 167), but all structures come from ‘outside’ the 15 
subject, whether as the desire of the other that is focused on by Lacanians or the enigmatic 
message that comes from Laplanche.1 It is in the nature of the human subject to be subjected to 
this violence, just as it is in the nature of the social polity to be formed through an act of 
violence, an exclusionary act that produces the outside other (Palacios, 2009). This violence 
creates its own responsibility: there would be no ethical stance involved if there were no struggle 20 
to be undertaken. Butler (2009a) writes, 
                                                 
1  ,COMP: FN HAS BEEN MOVED TO END> 
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It is precisely because one is mired in violence that the struggle exists and 
that the possibility of non-violence emerges. ... Non-violence is precisely 
neither a virtue nor a position and certainly not a set of principles that are to 
be applied universally. It denotes the mired and conflicted position of a 
subject who is injured, rageful, disposed to violent retribution and 5 
nevertheless struggles against that action (often crafting the rage against 
itself). The struggle against violence accepts that violence is one’s own 
possibility. ( p. 171) 
That is what makes the brutality of Klein superior to the gentility of Winnicott, however much 
one might have preferred to be his analysand rather than hers. Lacan (1953–54, p. 69) referred to 10 
Klein’s ‘animal instinct’, her capacity to home in on what is needed, even when her theory is too 
clumsy to encompass it fully. Discussing her case of ‘little Dick’ (Klein, 1930), Lacan 
commented that, ‘[s]he slams the symbolism on him with complete brutality, does Melanie 
Klein, on little Dick!’ (p. 68). Such brutal truth-telling is sometimes needed. For Klein, envy 
exists from the start of life as the pure manifestation of the death drive; it does not have to be 15 
conjured by some environmental failure, some inattention on the part of the mother or hole in the 
protective atmospheric layer offered by the father. In fact, it is exaggerated by too much 
goodness: the breast that gives is also the one that is envied and attacked for its capacity to give, 
a capacity the subject knows itself to lack. So the task of life is to find ways to overcome this 
destructive urge. As Michael Rustin (1991) notes, writing this into sociology means asserting 20 
that the task of social life is to create conditions that can cope with the potential destructiveness 
of human subjects and of the social itself. Horrible things cannot be wished away; they are there 
in the construction of the subject. Butler (2009a) comments, ‘For Klein, as well as for Levinas, 
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the meaning of responsibility is bound up with an anxiety that remains open, that does not settle 
an ambivalence through disavowal, but rather gives rise to a certain ethical practice, itself 
experimental, that seeks to preserve life better than it destroys it’ (p. 177). 
To preserve life better than it destroys it: Butler explores the economy of injury that 
enters into intersubjective conflicts. Making all subjects produced from the injuries of neglect 5 
can work against taking responsibility for violence: one is always injured oneself, through lack 
of recognition and failures of holding or containment; and rage emanates from that injury. An 
injured subject, seeing itself as constantly responding to the violence done to it, blocks 
acknowledgement of the violence it might gratuitously do. A reason can always be found for 
violence, something done to the subject that legitimises or excuses it. It may be that the 10 
gradations in how much some people act out the injury they feel, and how much others hold back 
from such retaliatory violence, is connected to the capacity for recognition. If the subject is 
constituted by and in violence, then whether or not it has suffered injury is no longer the point: 
the temptation to violence is in any case there, and acknowledgement of the violence one does 
arises from, as Butler (2009a) puts it,‘[A]n understanding of the possibilities of one’s own 15 
violent actions in relation to those lives to which one is bound, including  those whom one never 
chose and never knew, and so those whose relation to me precedes the stipulation of contract’ (p. 
179).  
We are inching closer to the question of acknowledgement, perhaps. It is not that 
everyone suffers injuries, which they do, but that everyone is subjected to injury by every other 20 
subject. Every subject has injuriousness within it and is tempted to express that in relation to 
others with whom it has contact and on whom it is likely to be dependent. When we share a 
space, whether physical or psychical, we are likely to do harm. Recognition of this tendency to 
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violence, this temptation to destroy everything, leads to recognition of the responsibility one has 
to struggle against the temptation and to acknowledge what one has done when the struggle fails. 
It is not for nothing that Levinas (1990) called his Talmudic reading on the Revelation at Mount 
Sinai the ‘Temptation of Temptation’, indexing the opportunity the Jews had then to destroy the 
world rather than accept the constraints of the Law. Destruction is an impulse that arises out of 5 
the tendency to violence and may be pinned onto the injury one suffers, but is not produced by it. 
Jessica Benjamin has worked acknowledgement into both her clinical and her political 
practice. One can see how it operates as a mode of recognition ‘that has a transformational effect, 
modulating the traumatic reactions that perpetuate cycles of reactivity and creating the sense of a 
lawful social world that witnesses pain and takes responsibility for injustice’ (Benjamin, 2009a). 10 
Lawfulness and justice is at the heart of this effect of recognition; the act of acknowledgement 
confirms these things and is not an idealisation, does not imagine that a holistic oneness with the 
other can be achieved. Whatever the doubt that she might not pursue destructiveness to its 
depths, whatever the theoretical worry that there is a brand of psychoanalytic humanism at work 
here that wishes troubles away, Benjamin is a forceful advocate for a mode of taking 15 
responsibility through acknowledgement that leaves no stone unturned. In the clinic, she asserts 
the efficaciousness of a mode of mutuality that she calls the ‘moral third’, defined as  ‘the 
courage for the nonjudgmental awareness that honestly recognizes moments of dissociation, 
misattunement, defensiveness – aspects of what was called in the narrow sense 
countertransference’ (Benjamin, 2009b, p. 442). The analyst takes responsibility for harm done, 20 
even if not caused, by her or his failures of attunement and recognition; these are not 
countertransference responses to failures in the patient, but real moments of destructiveness that 
may parallel the patient’s own ‘unintegrated or warring self-parts’ (p. 441) but are nevertheless 
the analyst’s responsibility. The moral third, she writes,  
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becomes more urgently relevant as we increasingly accept the analyst’s role 
in contributing to breakdown, rather than simply being the one responsible 
for repairing it. This awareness of the analyst’s contribution goes along with 
an examination of how the analyst may have dissociated along with the 
patient and requires that the analyst take responsibility for her failures. The 5 
principle of acknowledgment may only reveal its true value when we are 
able, as a community, to give up the ideal of being a ‘complete container’, 
to surrender to the fact that we survive causing pain. (p. 442) 
Benjamin’s emphasis on responsibility has direct implications for working with others and 
governs her thinking on reconciliation work in Israel-Palestine (Altman et al, 2006). Political 10 
involvement in this specific instance is coded as the need for engagement with Palestinian 
suffering from the perspective of accepting responsibility as a Jew. Benjamin links this 
involvement with the analyst’s realisation that, whilst she or he might be the ‘activator of old 
traumas, old pain’ rather than their instigator 'you acknowledge that you have, you know, 
bumped into the person’s bruise, and you acknowledge that there is hurt and pain and that you 15 
may have responsibility for that, and in doing this, you alleviate a whole level of tension that 
makes it possible, then, to talk about, to explore’ (p. 170). In both the political and the 
therapeutic context, recognition and responsibility go hand in hand, each entailing the other. 
Taking responsibility for others arises from recognition of their existence as genuine 
centres of subjectivity, not just as possessing rights but also having the capacity to be hurt. The 20 
analyst ‘bruises’ the patient merely by being there, by the inevitable clumsiness and failure that 
come from being different, though her or his infelicities might make this bruising greater. Hence, 
in the tradition of Winnicott, Benjamin advocates acknowledging mistakes rather than simply 
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interpreting their effects. For her, this is not a matter of making the patient in some way 
responsible for the analyst’s actions, nor of requiring from the patient forgiveness of the analyst. 
‘On the contrary’, she writes,  ‘it should serve to reveal how the analyst takes on the 
responsibility for forgiving herself and thus being able to transcend the shame of her difficulties 
enough to talk about and analyze them (without excessive or impulsive self-disclosure)’ 5 
(Benjamin, 2009b, pp. 449–450). By this means the patient may be helped to contribute 
reciprocally to the analytic relationship, becoming ‘an interpreter of the analyst and a co-creator 
of dialogue, and so develop her own sense of agency and responsibility’ (p. 450). The emphasis 
on mutuality here is strong, but it still relies on the analyst’s capacity to start it off. ‘Bumping 
into the person’s bruise’ is bound to occur; it is a necessary part of therapy because, if one is to 10 
look truthfully at what exists, then pain is bound to be felt. But this does not mean it can all be 
put back onto the other; the subject/analyst has responsibility, even if the damage is unavoidable. 
Can this argument be extended into a way of affecting the social violence that is found 
throughout the world, and is there some area of responsibility that has to be acknowledged even 
when we are not, individually, ‘to blame’? When she is in Israel as a visiting Jewish academic 15 
and analyst, Benjamin’s stance, she thinks, makes a difference. 
[A]cknowledgement of the other person’s suffering that we may not have 
directly caused, but in which we participate as Americans, and in which I 
participate, in some sense, as a Jew, was enormously important. I found that 
because this is being done in my name, regardless of the political 20 
background of the oppression being carried out in the Territories by the 
Israeli army, I need to acknowledge responsibility. My identification of 
responsibility for, first, not really being able to know or understand the 
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suffering of the Palestinians, and, secondly, being in some way allied with 
those who cause it, was important to me, and had a huge effect on people 
there. In many cases they were less interested in political details in many 
ways than they were in having this acknowledgement. That is to say that 
this was the first step in any political process. (Altman et al, 2006, pp. 169–5 
170) 
For Jews, Benjamin argues, there is special responsibility, and special power to taking 
responsibility, in the case of violence towards Palestinians.  Butler (2009b) also takes up the 
theme of damage done ‘in my name’ simply by being a Jew:  ‘Given that Israel acts within the 
name of the Jewish people and casts itself as the legitimate representative of the Jewish people,’ 10 
she says (13 mins), ‘there is a question of what is done in the name of the Jewish people, and so 
all the more reason to reclaim that tradition and ethics in favour of another politics.’ For both 
these psychopolitical advocates, speaking of acknowledgement as a Jew raises the stakes. It 
opens them up to accusations of Jewish anti-Semitism, a calumny contested head-on by Butler 
(2004): ‘With what difficulty does one vigorously defend the idea that the Israeli occupation is 15 
brutal and wrong, and that Palestinian self-determination is a necessary good, if the voicing of 
those views calls down upon oneself the horrible charge of anti-Semitism?’ (p. 104). It might be 
said here that this charge of anti-Semitism is, indeed, a crucial silencing device within the Jewish 
community and that it is not only imposed from outside: a good deal of self-censoring goes on, 
fueled by anxiety about being marginalised, but also by a genuine dread of hurting those to 20 
whom one is close. It is an act of ethical bravery to take a stand here, exactly the contrary of the 
‘self-hating’ sobriquet so commonly used against Jewish critics of Israel. Butler herself , going 
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on to surmount the difficulty she names,;  establishes a critical stance towards Israel in the name 
of Jewish ethics itself, a stance with a long Jewish history and, one hopes, a future.  
Benjamin is well attuned not just to the political difficulty, which does not seem 
particularly to worry her, but also to the psychological one. In a passionate speech provoked by a 
conference on psycho-political resistance in Israel–Palestine, ‘fired up’, as she said privately 5 
afterwards by the reiteration of experiences of struggle, oppression and attempts at 
reconciliation, she describes different types of ‘unbearable knowledge’, the most recalcitrant 
being the unbearable knowledge that one is oneself a ‘perpetrator’ (Benjamin, 2009a). 
Renouncing the victim position is a necessary step in the acknowledgement process, one that 
parallels Butler’s call to move beyond recourse to one’s own injuries as a justification for 10 
violence. It is also, however, a vast existential move for those whose status has been defined in 
terms of the victim position. ‘What do you do when you live in a society where you are a 
perpetrator and everyone is in denial of that?’ Benjamin asks (7 mins). Humanising the 
perpetrator becomes the challenge that the victim can make: ‘You are a human being who is 
capable of taking responsibility, now please do this for me’ (12 mins).  15 
But for the one who is doing the injury, the perpetrator, things are not necessarily so easy. 
From where does one draw the strength to acknowledge the damage done through one’s own acts 
of violence? Benjamin argues that a process of dissociation goes on amongst perpetrators in 
which even the genuine hurt they may have suffered themselves becomes somehow cut off, as if 
it were not actually felt; otherwise, she claims, it would be impossible for them to perpetrate such 20 
hurt on others. Really feeling one’s own suffering should, in this humanistic vision, make it 
impossible to inflict such suffering on others. By implication, however, this means that 
acknowledging the damage one does also brings to the fore, in a felt way, the damage done to 
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oneself. The ‘witness’ is important in facilitating this. Just as a psychoanalyst needs to adopt the 
position of the moral third in order to reveal how we all cause pain, so the witness in the triad 
‘perpetrator-victim-witness’ makes it possible for the perpetrator to shift from defensive denial 
and for the victim to be empowered, by acknowledging her or his own complicity in perpetuating 
the abusive situation. ‘The only way to get out of the perpetrator position,’ Benjamin says (23 5 
mins), ‘is to recognize that that is a part of you, but also be able to feel that it is not the only part 
of you; and the only way for that to be not all that you are, this bad perpetrator, is for the witness 
to say, “I also am that, and I have that in me”’.  
But who can be this witness? In the context of the Israel–Palestine conflict, there is a role 
for the West and particularly perhaps for America in acknowledging its position in maintaining 10 
the troubles. Benjamin calls all who have such a role but do not fulfil it ‘failed witnesses’, 
perhaps the worst kind – those who appear to be witnessing but are not, in fact, doing so. 
However, it seems from this material that the primary witness here will be the Jews, in whose 
name Israel operates and for whom it ostensibly exists. There is an enormous amount of friction 
in Benjamin's  apparently simple statement, a friction played out throughout the Jewish 15 
community in the diaspora as well as in Israel. This friction gives rise to a wide range of 
defensive statements and a great deal of internecine antagonism. For some, any criticism of Israel 
is an anathema, a betrayal of identity and identification. For many others, it is legitimate but 
immensely painful and always likely to implode when it seems ‘unbalanced’ or unfair. What is it 
that we are supposed to acknowledge? What damage have I done if I am a critic of Israel? For 20 
what can I be called into account? What about Jewish suffering and, of course, the victims of 
Palestinian terror? Who cares for us that we should care for them?  If ‘I go first’, as some Israeli 
Jews believe themselves to have done, what guarantee is there that anyone will go second? What 
about the blending of anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism, which even careful, progressive and 
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scholarly critics of Israel such as Butler (2009b) acknowledge exists? ‘For the record,’ she states, 
‘I would like to make clear that some of those criticisms do employ anti-Semitic rhetoric and do 
engage anti-Semitic sentiment although many of those criticisms do not, especially those but not 
exclusively those that emerge from within Jewish frameworks of social justice’ (11 mins).  
The array of defensiveness to be found amongst Jews is not always cynical; one has to 5 
read it as a consequence of a deeply felt and painful immersion in the hope and pride of Jewish 
national identity, now gone sour for many Jews but still felt, still a space for a certain kind of 
optimism and security. Under such circumstances, how can acknowledgement come about, 
without a move to self-abasement that will poison as much as it will cure?                                                              
Butler addresses the dilemma of Jewish identification and self-criticism by uncovering a strand 10 
of Jewish tradition that refuses the defensive retreat into the self-justifications provided by even 
genuine injury. She calls on ‘Jewish frameworks of social justice’, which she pursues through a 
series of moves that draw on Hannah Arendt and Walter Benjamin. Butler (2004) announces the 
foundational position in a long passage from Precarious Life: 
[I]t is probably fair to say that for most progressive Jews who carry the 15 
legacy of the Shoah in their psychic and political formations, the ethical 
framework within which we operate takes the form of the following 
question: will we be silent (and be a collaborator with illegitimately violent 
power), or will we make our voices heard (and be counted among those 
who did what they could to stop illegitimate violence), even if speaking 20 
poses a risk to ourselves. The Jewish effort to criticise Israel during these 
times emerges, I would argue, precisely from this ethos. And though the 
critique is often portrayed as insensitive to Jewish suffering, in the past and 
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in the present, its ethic is wrought precisely from that experience of 
suffering, so that suffering itself might stop, so that something we might 
reasonably call the sanctity of life might be honoured equitably and truly. 
The fact of enormous suffering does not warrant revenge or legitimate 
violence, but must be mobilized in the service of a politics that seeks to 5 
diminish suffering universally, that seeks to recognize the sanctity of life, of 
all lives. (pp. 103–104) 
As Butler notes, that is very much the standard post-Shoah progressive Jewish ethical stance. It 
is also in the tradition of the Biblical injunction about learning from one’s own experience: ‘And 
you shall not wrong a stranger, nor shall you oppress him; for you were strangers in the land of 10 
Egypt’ (Exodus 22: 20). The suffering of the Jews does not mean that everyone else should be 
damned; rather, it sensitises Jews to the suffering of others. One’s experience of injury does not 
legitimise injurious behaviour; instead, it places one in the position of empathy. As Benjamin 
suggests, really feeling one’s own hurt should mean that one acts to prevent others' having to go 
through the same experience. Butler’s ethic is both general and specific: in general, the 15 
experience of suffering should lead to ‘a politics that seeks to diminish suffering universally’; 
specifically, Jewish suffering means that Jews should prevent suffering befalling others. This is 
why, she states, ‘[T]o openly and publicly criticize such violence is in some ways an obligatory 
ethical demand from within certain Jewish frameworks, both religious and non-religious’ 
(Butler, 2009a, 11 mins).  20 
Once again, however, the fraught question of the inequality of suffering is raised by 
Butler’s powerful and poignant argument, which goes to the heart of the questions of recognition 
and acknowledgement and is both more rigorous and in some ways less consistent than 
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Benjamin’s intersubjective approach. For Benjamin, destruction can be survived; mutual 
recognition is a real possibility, however difficult it is to achieve, and it has the power to shift the 
trajectories of insult that inflict such damage on the world. The responsibility of perpetrator and 
witness is to make this happen through the act of acknowledging the pain one causes. For Butler, 
the temptation to violence is intrinsic to the human condition, linked to dependency and 5 
vulnerability and making the embrace of nonviolence an ethical act. However, Butler is also a 
clear expositor of the way in which certain lives are more vulnerable than others, more 
‘precarious’, and of how some people are systematically ruled out of the domain of the ‘human’ 
precisely so that they can continue to be exploited and oppressed. One might ask a very 
conventional question about this: are such precarious subjects exempted from the full weight of 10 
responsibility for all the hurt that occurs in the world? Or is it actually the case that all human 
subjects are equally responsible? Does the ethical universalism that makes taking responsibility 
an act required of every subject also place an unbearable ethical burden on those who have been 
victimized more than others, perhaps because they have been subjected to systemic or 
institutional violence? Or does Butler’s own highly principled adoption of the precarity 15 
framework lie in tension with the equally principled Levinasian assertion of universal 
responsibility?  
Whilst those may indeed be familiar questions, dangerously establishing the ground for 
an opt-out from responsibility (‘We have been so badly hurt that recognition and 
acknowledgement does not apply here; we are the victims of violence so why should we 20 
forgive?’), they have both practical and theoretical consequences. Practically, they form exactly 
the argument adopted by many Jews in their defence of Israel: the hurt we have suffered is such 
that we cannot be held responsible in the same way. For those of us ranged against this position, 
it is almost unbearable to hear it expressed, which is why the careful arguments advanced by 
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Butler and others are so precious and so worthy of dissemination. But this does not mean that 
one can ignore the problem: at what point does my injury and victim position mean that others 
have to go first in their acknowledgement before I am called on to own up to my own destructive 
urges?  
In terms of theory, we might be in the realm of the contestation indexed by Slavoj Žižek 5 
(2005) in his debate with Butler over the issue of ‘ethical violence’. Žižek disputes what he calls 
the ‘solidarity of the vulnerable’ (p. 139) opened up by Butler’s insistence on human ‘weakness’ 
and her reinstatement of a prospect of ethical recognition. In contrast, Žižek proposes that an 
ethical act breaks up the encounter with the other by introducing the realm of the ‘third’, in a 
very different way from that proposed by Benjamin. Instead of the third being a space of mutual 10 
encounter, it is, rather, a force – the symbolic – that comes from outside the intersubjective order 
and regulates it according to some other principle. This necessarily disjunctive element 
introduced into the subject–other relation constitutes a form of violence; hence, Žižek’s 
rendering of ‘ethical violence’ is very different from Butler’s. 
In order to render our coexistence with the Thing minimally bearable, the 15 
symbolic order qua Third, the pacifying mediator, has to intervene: the 
‘gentrification’ of the Other-Thing into a ‘normal human fellow’ cannot 
occur through our direct interaction, but presupposes the third agency to 
which we both submit ourselves – there is no intersubjectivity (no 
symmetrical, shared relation between humans) without the impersonal 20 
symbolic Order. (pp. 143–144) 
The opacity of the other or ‘neighbour’, in Žižek’s view, is not something to be ‘gentrified’ and 
romanticised; it is the arena of threat and horror, and the point of a social ethics is lost if one 
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converts this into an appeal for recognition and responsibility. The polarization here might be too 
great, but the debate uncovers some of the political tension surrounding an ethics based on 
recognition. Recognizing the other through the Levinasian dynamic adopted by Butler 
ameliorates something that has to be kept alive in its forceful destructiveness; a true ethics will 
be one that breaks into this and usurps it with a commitment to an objective – hence truly 5 
‘ethical’ – justice. Whilst this argument has many ramifications and its own aporias (Frosh, 
2010), it also latches on to an issue that the recognition literature has never resolved. If it is truly 
the case that destructiveness is endemic to relational encounters, then the move towards an 
ethical system cannot rely on the face-to-face but instead requires something else to intervene, 
something that restricts and regulates, facilitates and judges. If this can go by the name of 10 
‘justice’, it suggests that not everyone will be equally responsible for everything that occurs. 
True justice treats every subject equally, but it also differentiates among them in its judgements. 
It is no accident that Butler’s (2009b) articulation of a maximalist position of ethical 
relationality and responsibility takes her to a messianic frame, albeit a famously secular one. 
Taking opacity to be the heart of identity and estrangement from self to be the condition of 15 
relationality, Butler sees the exilic condition as the source of Jewish ethics. Following Hannah 
Arendt and Walter Benjamin, she takes diaspora as key and regards the nationalism that 
produces unquestioning identification with the state of Israel as a defensive regression. For her, 
drawing from but opposing Gershom Scholem (1941), the kabbalistic imagery of the breaking of 
the ten sefirot (the vessels set aside to hold God’s holiness) during creation represents the divine 20 
scattering of light across all peoples and thus marks out the necessity of Jews living amongst 
others. The messianic gathering-in of these holy sparks is not a metaphor for gathering in only 
the Jews; reading messianism through Walter Benjamin’s secular eyes, it represents the 
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‘suffering of the oppressed that flashed up during moments of emergency and that interrupted 
both homogenous and teleological time’ (Butler, 2009b, 30 mins). The sparks are distributed 
precisely so that they can be found everywhere, in the other (including the non-Jewish other) as 
well as in the subject. They can never be fully gathered together into one place; that is the point, 
the reason why the vessels broke in the first place, because sanctity can never be made one 5 
subject’s possession.  
‘Dispossession’ is key, dispossession without the idea of redemption, of gathering in. In 
line with other recent attempts to contest Zionist appropriations of Jewish history as solely a 
history of despair, awaiting the Zionist redemption (Frosh, 2009), the diasporic and exilic are 
advanced here, made the condition for recognising the suffering of others and proceeding 10 
towards an assault on that suffering rather than a replication of it. ‘Redemption is to be rethought 
as the exilic without return – a disruption of teleological history and an opening to convergent 
and interruptive sets of temporality,’ says Butler (2009b, 32 mins). Jewish history is not one of 
gathering in the sparks to redeem only the Jews; it is one of allowing the sparks to infiltrate, to 
penetrate or interrupt the continuation of suffering, so that what has been experienced can 15 
become the source of an ethical stance, so that ‘because we were strangers’ we do not become 
oppressors. It is thus an emancipatory vocabulary, despite its melancholic structure. The 
breaking of the vessels is usually interpreted as the source of a fragmented system that needs to 
be put right, demanding a reparative response that is itself the marker of the messianic as ‘end of 
history’. By contrast, Butler’s use of Walter Benjamin here advances the cause of continuing 20 
‘flashing up’ of the hidden sparks, in which those who have lost most and who are written out of 
humanity have the chance to return, to make their presence felt. Perhaps recognition and 
acknowledgement culminate in this, a kind of return of the repressed that has to be worked for 
rather than defended against. 
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 A Dark Vocabulary 
The vocabulary of relational ethics becomes in this context a socio-religious vocabulary as well 
as a psychoanalytic and psychosocial one. It is a dark vocabulary, one that causes strife. It 
demands renunciation of the preciously cultivated victim position that is so often used to warrant 
violence. It is a vocabulary not of forgiveness, but of responsibility, including responsibility for 5 
hurts that one has not perpetrated oneself but has witnessed. It is a vocabulary of active 
witnessing that opposes the failed witnessing of those who watch but do not intervene. It is a 
vocabulary of acknowledgement, if acknowledgement means going first into the domain of 
witnessing and taking on the responsibility of stating one’s own injurious behaviour, one’s own 
destructive intent. In relation to the damage done, this is a dark vocabulary that stirs up wounds 10 
and that faces people with existential anxiety. If we cannot take refuge in our victimhood but 
instead have to face the reality of suffering, we have to face both the suffering we have 
undergone and the suffering we cause. This prises open identities closed around historical self-
justification; it reveals not only the opaque domain of each subject, but also the dependence of 
each of us on the others amongst whom we live. The building of walls, the shutting down of 15 
communication, the separation of communities are all modes of defence, explicitly and 
intentionally; they are also acts of violence that explicitly and again intentionally rule the other 
out of the domain of the human, to whom damage can be done.  
But maybe context also matters, and the universalising tendency of this work is less 
helpful than its focus on particular contexts. Butler’s appeal to Jewish ethics, for instance, is a 20 
statement of her own personal specificity: this is one place from where she comes, this is the 
relevant pull and source for her thinking about Israel, this is the grand sweep of a history and 
philosophy that has something more to say than that ‘God gave us the land’. Read this way, it is 
26 
 
not a programme of universal ethics, because to claim that it is – however beautifully it might 
read – would be to make the Jews somehow responsible for all hurt. The philosophy of ethical 
relationality has by no means been formulated solely by Jewish writers, yet they have been very 
present in its history, and there is a danger that they – we – might mistake it for our own.  
Claiming a universal ‘Jewish ethics’ promotes the disappearance of any specific Jewish identity 5 
in a kind of ‘reverse exceptionalism’ (others are entitled to their ‘own’ identity, but the Jews are 
responsible for everything), with certain dangers in tow. We are not responsible for everything. 
On the other hand, the work on recognition and acknowledgement promotes the 
realisation that what we are genuinely responsible for is quite enough. Without a level of self-
abasement that makes recognition of the other meaningless (I have to be a subject if my 10 
recognition of you is to be worth anything), we have to find a way to achieve recognition in 
acknowledgement; that is, to know that what we say is worth saying, because it relates to what is, 
without its theoretical caveats, the real. For maybe the authors drawn on here are correct in their 
contentious claim that if one truly feels the injury done to oneself one cannot do it to others, 
except if these others are defined as non-human, as not suffering in the same way, as not 15 
amenable to the imaginative link that makes our suffering generalisable. If the sparks of light can 
do anything at all, as they mix up between people, they should at least bring these derogated 
others to life again; and in so doing, they will disturb us all – not just Jews in relation to 
Palestinians, but human subjects in relation to ourselves.  
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 Notes 5 
 1. Given the extensive use that Butler (2005) makes of Laplanche, it might be useful to note that 
the notion of an ‘enigmatic signifier’ actually derives from Lacan’s (1957) essay, 'The Agency of 
the Letter' (see Fletcher and Stanton, 1992). John Fletcher (personal communication, July 2010) 
writes, ‘Laplanche uses the same phrase but gradually gives it a different meaning; for Lacan it 
references the “letter in the unconscious” that has been substituted for by the symptom in the 10 
subject of “sexual trauma”. Laplanche uses it in the context of the situation and structure of 
primal seduction to reference the traumatizing transmission from the other that is enigmatic 
because of its own repressed dimension’.  
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